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General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda item 109
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

Identical letters dated 7 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to draw your attention to the following.

The Syrian Arab Republic has adopted a transparent and credible approach in laying out the facts of what is happening in Syria. In that context, it wishes to present the preliminary findings of the national committee of investigation into the horrific and disgraceful Hula massacre. The investigation has been open and transparent, and the Government has shown full cooperation. The witnesses who provided information came from the region in question. Syria has announced the preliminary findings of the investigations in keeping with its self-imposed commitment to establish a national committee of investigation and to present its preliminary findings within three days of its establishment. Eyewitness accounts of the massacre are also provided, but the Government has not disclosed the witnesses' identities owing to fear of reprisals against them by armed terrorist groups.

The preliminary conclusions of the report issued by the judicial committee responsible for investigating the Hula massacre indicates that all of the victims came from non-violent families that refused to rise against the State; they had never once demonstrated or carried weapons, and were opposed to the armed terrorist groups. The victims were killed by close-range gunfire and sharp instruments, rather than by bombardments.

The preliminary conclusions show that the armed terrorist groups that gathered in Hula eliminated the victims in the course of an attack against law enforcement forces. The latter did not enter the area in which the massacre took place. A large number of the bodies were those of terrorists who had been killed in the clash with law enforcement forces.

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Staff Brigadier General Jamal Qasim al-Sulayman, the Chair of the committee investigating the massacre, said that findings were preliminary; the investigation is continuing, with due consideration for the protection of witnesses and evidence.

Al-Sulayman added that the committee of investigation was formed pursuant to Administrative Order No. 42 of 28 May 2012 issued by the General Command of the Army and Armed Forces. The investigation relied on directly verifiable accounts, which were provided by directly concerned individuals who had been exposed to the horrifying massacre. The preliminary report relied on evidence and facts regarding the armed attack on law enforcement forces in the town.

The Chair of the committee explained that law enforcement forces had been based at five positions in the Hula area, and that the armed attack on the area had been intended to fully eliminate the presence of the State and bring the area outside State control.

Al-Sulayman stated that the armed men had gathered inside the village after Friday prayers and launched a simultaneous attack with support from between 600 and 800 other armed men. The latter had entered the area in coordination with the local armed men, coming from such neighbouring areas as Rastan, Si'n, Burj Qa'i and Sam'alin. Every type of heavy weapon was used: mortars, machine guns and every variety of armour-piercing missile. They focused on two law enforcement positions which were the fundamental target of the premeditated attack. The first, known as al-Qaws, was at the entrance of the village of Tall Daww. The second was at the Clock roundabout.

Al-Sulayman said that the armed groups from outside the village then simultaneously began to eliminate non-violent families in the course of the attack on the law enforcement positions.

Al-Sulayman pointed out that the massacre took place in an area where armed terrorist groups were present. Law enforcement officers did not enter that area before or after the massacre. It is at some distance from their checkpoints, where the armed terrorist groups had mounted lethal operations against them. They did not leave their position, as they were defending themselves against the terrorist groups. This can be verified by looking at the pictures of the victims which were shown on the satellite channels. The pictures show that the massacre was perpetrated using close-range gunfire and sharp instruments. It was not a result of artillery fire; the bodies of the victims did not show any sign of crushing, burning, or wounds caused by falling walls or artillery shrapnel. All of the foregoing shows that what took place was direct elimination.

The preliminary data available to the committee indicates that armed groups set up five mortars in and around the town of Tall Daww, in order to target any law enforcement forces that might enter the town. It was noticed that a significant number of the victims were children. Killing those children would bring no benefit to the law enforcement officers or the State. Rather, it served an intended objective of the armed terrorist groups, namely to instigate strife, spread conflict and undermine the unity of the nation — something that goes against the interests of the State and the Army.

The Chair of the investigating committee stated that verifications and direct testimonies from inside the area show that all of the victims of the massacre came from non-violent families that had refused to rise against the State; they had never

once demonstrated or carried weapons, and were opposed to the armed terrorist groups. Those groups therefore had an interest and a purpose in killing them: to bring about a humanitarian and military intervention in the country, in whatever form, and to get rid of a nuisance that could propagate the use of reason and the promotion of national stability to other countries in the region.

The primary target of the massacre were the relatives of a member of Parliament, Abdulmu'ti Mashlab. The aim was to wreak revenge against him for having defied the perpetrators by standing for office and being elected to Parliament. That was before their plan was overtaken by events and the massacre extended to other families.

Al-Sulayman pointed out that because there had been an intensive presence of armed men in the area for some time, no group could have entered the area without their knowledge, or the knowledge of groups affiliated with them. Some of the bodies that were displayed as part of the massacre were in fact those of armed men from outside the town who had been killed during their attack on law enforcement forces.

Al-Sulayman emphasized that the massacre carried out by armed terrorist groups is part of a plan to make the international community believe that Syria is on the brink of civil war, coinciding with the arrival of the United Nations Special Envoy Kofi Annan. The plan stems from the groups' failure in targeting Syria, which has shown genuine cooperation with all constructive initiatives.

It is also important to point out that the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed immediately to allow international observers to go to the site of the massacre. When they arrived, there were both martyrs and armed men who had been killed in the clash. The latter were added to the victims of the massacre. The bodies were taken to the village mosque in the armed men's cars to be photographed, in order to make it seem as though the massacre was of that magnitude. The observers were then subjected to a flood of lies in front of the camera, pictures that would be seen around the world.

We also wish to draw your attention to other massacres on which we have shed light, such as those of Karm al-Zaytun and Dayr Ba'albah. The Syrian Government was accused of perpetrating them, but that story later turned out to be incorrect. An investigation is under way, and further leads are being discovered that have a connection with this massacre. The international media has focused on certain massacres as opposed to others because a particular confessional group was involved. In Syria, we refuse to consider any Syrian on the basis of his confessional identity, and will continue to do so. Syria will not allow itself to behave in such a manner.

We wish to inform you that there are circles, shady rooms, that are working around the clock to strike at the fabric of Syrian society by sparking sectarian conflict. Even after the Hula massacre, an attempt was made to target another village with a different sectarian fabric; however, the armed terrorist groups were unsuccessful in doing so.

Terrorist operations and bombings have recently gathered pace in Syria. The committee set out some of those incidents in its oral update. The question is who stands to benefit from the escalating bombings and terrorist operations. Syria respects its international commitments and has signed an understanding and a

preliminary six-point plan. At the same time, however, there are stated commitments on the other side that should be implemented. There are States whose ministers for foreign affairs openly declare that they are arming, funding and harbouring terrorists. It follows that there is a side that does not stand to gain from the Annan plan, whose success would also be a success for Syria.

In his speech before Parliament on 3 June 2012, on the occasion of the first legislative session of Parliament under the new constitution, the President of the Republic highlighted the horror of the Hula massacre and pointed out that it had been used in the most abject manner for propaganda against Syria:

> "We have described what happened in Hula, in Qazaz and Maydan (two terrorist explosions that hit Damascus), in Dayr al-Zawr (a massacre a few days before, in which armed terrorist groups killed 11 labourers who were going to work, and which those groups sought to blame on Syria), Aleppo (a terrorist explosion that struck the city) and many other parts of Syria, as despicable and barbaric massacres. In fact, even barbarians would not commit the actions we have seen, particularly the Hula massacre. I doubt if Arabic language, or even the language of humanity as a whole, can describe what we have seen (...).
>
> After the despicable Hula massacre, they accused the armed forces. At first, they said that artillery and tanks had been used. Then they instantly reversed that story because they felt where the people's support lay. They realized that to accuse the armed forces of a crime was to accuse every Syrian citizen, without exception, of being a criminal and a terrorist. So they moved on to talking about so-called pro-Government militias."

The latter story is not true either, as is clear from the committee's preliminary findings referred to above.

As regards witnesses to the crime, extracts of the statements of two witnesses are given below. Their identities have been withheld in order to protect them from reprisals from armed terrorist groups.

The first, male witness stated as follows:

> "Three days before the massacre, they were talking about something that would happen on Friday, something special, something big. They kept talking about it, so much that we were longing to know what the big event would be.
>
> On Friday, after the noon prayer, a unit of armed men gathered in the northern quarter, near the checkpoint at the Clock roundabout. Other large groups headed towards what we call the Sadd road — which is officially called Tripoli road — and to the area known as Nasiriya, Sittu road and the road with the Abu Zayd pastry shop, which leads to the Al-Zahir family's marble workshop.
>
> The armed group in the northern quarter began to shoot into the air in order to occupy the Clock checkpoint and create the impression that they would open fire at it and attack it. It would be very difficult to reach or control it from those areas.
>
> I went to the Sadd road. I was with some large groups: the Salafi Khalid Abu al-Wahid group, the Abdulmalik al-Salih group, the Nidal Bakkur group, the Haytham al-Hisan group, the Ikrimah group, a group from Aqrab, one from

Kafr Laha, one from Tall Dhahab, and many outsiders who were heavily armed. They opened random fire on the law enforcement station, hitting it as well as civilians and homes.

Many of them did not know how to use weapons. One of them was using a PKC machine gun but lost control of it and was thrown backwards. Another launched a rocket-propelled grenade, which looks like a mortar shell but has a small propeller at the rear. Instead of the station, it hit the Zukahi family home, killing two people. All of this happened in full view of the armed men."

The eyewitness added that most of the victims died because the armed men were on their way to eliminate a particular family. The family included a member of Parliament; had not been on demonstrations; had sided with the State and kept away from trouble; and had money that had not been spent or donated to buy guns for the armed men. There was also an element of retaliation and long-standing family rivalries. The Al-Sayyid family was closely connected to the member of Parliament, and they wanted to "give him a present for his success in Parliament".

The witness also said:

"The Al-Hisan group hate the Al-Sayyid family intensely. They are killers. Their business is not revolution; it is abduction, killing, plundering and stealing petrol from pipelines, and they have funds totalling millions. This group was in front of the Al-Sayyid home on the other side of the road, next to the Abu Zayd pastry shop. They spread out and opened random fire. Their weapons were not trained on the law enforcement station, but in the opposite direction, towards the home of Uqbah al-Sayyid, his brother, his sister-in-law and the children who died. There was another home next to the Al-Sayyid home, which belonged to a relative of Nidal Bakkur. Why were its owners spared, when their neighbours were killed?

On the other side were the Al-Gharar family home and the Haddu family home or the Ali Bakkur family home, and nothing happened to them — so why target that house specifically? The same applies to the Abdurrazzaq family home. There are other houses next to it. One is the Zahir Bakkur household — why did nothing happen to it? The same goes for the houses of the Harmush family, where there was a mathematics teacher from the Na'san family — why did nothing happen to him or to his family? His house was next to the law enforcement station, only five metres away. The massacre happened because the armed men wished to target those families".

Using a map of Tall Daww, the eyewitness explained the locations of the homes in which the crimes took place; the location of the law enforcement station and checkpoints; the places where the armed men gathered; and how they carried out their planned and premeditated attacks.

The second, female eyewitness said:

"Last Friday, leaving aside the Friday before it, there was a large number of armed men, and many unfamiliar faces, in the Tall Daww area. The armed men started shelling the law enforcement checkpoint from our quarter. The shooter was called Fayiz al-Uksh. The checkpoint officers noticed him and returned fire, hitting him in the leg. He was taken to the field hospital in Kafr Laha.

They then opened heavy fire on the checkpoint. Other groups were receiving communications, which we could hear. We could hear them talking to one another on radio telephones. The larger unit of armed men was in the Nasiriya area and the Sadd area opposite the second checkpoint, known as the station, which had been burned. Another unit would stay where we were as a decoy for the law enforcement checkpoint.

There were several groups: one from Aqrab, one from Kafr Laha, one from Tall Dhahab, one from Tayyibah and several from Rastan. They were talking on radio telephones, which we could hear. They would say to one another, "Get me the Tall Dhahab group", or the Aqrab group, or the Rastan group.

The groups included outsiders to our village, whom we were seeing there for the first time. There were people from Tallaf and Burj, but not very many.

The attack on the checkpoints happened at the same time, at around 1.30 p.m. When the military position fell, several of its officers lay dead, as did a great number of the armed men; they spent some three hours transporting them.

The armed men shelled a BRDM armoured vehicle; we could see the smoke rising from it. They stole the ammunition and weapons from the station and took them to the northern quarter, to their own location, handing them around to one another.

The armed men set fire to the station immediately after looting it. They also set fire to the hospital and the trees behind it, which are close to Sadd and the National Hospital. When we went there, we found the trees charred.

After the position fell, I heard one of the men, whose name was Ikrimah al-Salih, talking on the radio telephone to two men called Nidal Bakkur and Khalid Abdulwahid. Nidal Bakkur was saying to him, "Send me a group of outsiders because we have a second operation". At that point, Haytham al-Hallam was walking and carrying a cleaver in addition to his weapon. He went over to the Nasiriya group, a group of some 200 armed men which he led. This was one of the biggest groups, and it was already specialized in theft and abduction.

The attack on the station took place directly from the area of Nasiriya and the Sadd road. After they gained control of the station, Nidal and Khalid talked, and outsider groups were sent to them. The person at the other end of the line said, "I'll send you the Aqrab group". It seems that he did not know who was the leader of that group. He must have asked who was in charge of it, because the other speaker mentioned the leader's name, saying, "the leader of the Aqrab group is called Yahiya al-You". The Kafr Laha group was not mentioned because they all knew about it.

The groups went towards the reservoir, where there were roads leading to the Sadd road. At around 7 p.m., we heard that the massacre had taken place. So only two hours had elapsed between the fall of the law enforcement station and the massacre.

By 8 p.m., they had moved the victims in cars to a mosque to the north, far away from the war zone that they were in. It was the Ram mosque. A man called Ghazi al-You then called and said, "Send me some Kea cars".

We saw them travelling in cars at 8 p.m., by which time the law enforcement station had fallen completely and Army reinforcements had not yet arrived.

The victims were from the Al-Sayyid family. Mu'awiya al-Sayyid was an officer in the Army, and had not deserted. Of course he was the target, because anyone who does not desert is a target and his life is in danger. He believed his life depended on his home being near the law enforcement checkpoint, and so did not want to leave the village.

There's a second household of the Al-Sayyid family, and there is a third one related to Abdulmu'ti Mashlab, whose election as a parliamentary secretary had been announced. And there was the Abdulrazzaq family. I know that they are loyal, except for one household that is armed. The Abdurrazzaq family is made up of four households, which were attacked. Their homes were on the Sadd road, behind the law enforcement station and near the river.

The Al-Sayyid family home was next to the armed men. If some of the so-called *shabiha* came and killed them, then why did they not also kill the children of the armed men? Why did the killing take place in those houses specifically? There are many other houses next to those of the armed men from the Al-Hallaq family, who are known among us as the Al-Hisan family, and the Abdurrazzaq family and the Bakkur family. Why did nobody from the Bakkur family die? Why did they target children only in the Abdurrazzaq family?

There was also a household of the Fa'ur family, all of whom were armed men. The famous cameraman is also a Fa'ur. One of them died and another instantly took his place. He is a cameraman for Al-Jazeera. Why did none of them die, when their houses were full of people?

The large number of bodies that they took out for the observers to be displayed as victims of the bombardment, were mostly those of the armed men, in addition to those of the other families that died."

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly under agenda item 109, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

Identical letters dated 7 June 2012 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am compelled to write today to convey the Palestinian leadership's serious concerns and outright condemnation of Israel's continuing illegal settlement policies and activities throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. In flagrant defiance of international law and the demands of the international community to cease this illegitimate, destructive campaign, Israel, the occupying Power, continues all manner of settlement activities on our land and continues to provoke and incite with repeated declarations regarding the mal-intent to further colonize the Palestinian land. Rather than acting in accordance with international law and United Nations resolutions to bring an end to its 45-year military occupation of the Palestinian land, it is clear that Israel has chosen instead to entrench this occupation to the detriment of the Palestinian people, the Israeli people and the prospects for peace between them and in the region as a whole.

The Israeli Government has once again declared its intention to construct thousands more illegal settlement units, most deep inside the Occupied West Bank, and in areas in and around Occupied East Jerusalem. This latest blatant provocation involves the announcement just hours ago of the intention to construct 2,500 more settlement units in "Gilo", a massive settlement near the city of Bethlehem. The occupying Power has also proclaimed its plans to establish a 300-unit settlement in a declared military compound near the settlement of "Beit El", an illegal, deceitful manoeuvre that comes in follow-up to recent attempts to "legalize" the theft of Palestinian land and so-called settlement outposts and to obstruct or circumvent court-ordered demolitions, particularly regarding the "Ulpana" settlement. Moreover, it has announced plans to illegally establish another 117 units in the "Ariel" settlement, 92 units in the "Maale Adumim" settlement, 144 units in the "Adam" settlement and 114 units in the "Efrat" settlement. In addition, there are plans for the construction of another 84 units in the "Kiryat Arba" settlement, which is located in Al-Khalil, where hundreds of extremist Israeli settlers have been deliberately transferred in the midst of 200,000 Palestinians, who are subjected daily

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to terror, violence and intimidation by those extremist settlers, including their children, who are taught to hate and to constantly harass and inflict harm and humiliation on the Palestinian civilian population living there.

At this time, we call upon the international community to be firm in its condemnation and rejection of all of Israel's illegal settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, regardless of the pretexts or unjustifiable justifications given by the Government of Israel. All settlements and settlement-related infrastructure, including the Wall, are illegal no matter where they are constructed in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in East Jerusalem. Colonization of occupied territory via the transfer of citizens of the occupying Power is strictly prohibited by article 49 (6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, is considered to be a grave breach under Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions, and constitutes a war crime under article 8 (2) (a) (iv) and (b) (viii) of the Rome Statute. Moreover, the illegality of this practice and the demands for its complete cessation and reversal have been repeatedly reaffirmed by the United Nations General Assembly, Security Council, Human Rights Council and Economic and Social Council as well as by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion dated 9 July 2004. It is also imperative to recall Israel's obligation under the road map to freeze all settlement activities, including so-called "natural growth", and to dismantle all settlement outposts erected since March 2001.

In total defiance and disrespect of the rule of law and the international community, Israel continues to breach all of its legal obligations and commitments in this regard without consequence. It is incumbent on the international community, including the Security Council, to act collectively and responsibly to bring a halt to this illegitimate situation. Practical measures must be considered to compel Israel, the occupying Power, to halt this illegal campaign or to be held accountable for its violations and obstruction of the efforts to attain peace and security. It is unquestionable that Israel's illegal settlement activities are destroying the viability and physical attainability of the two-State solution on the basis of the pre-1967 borders and constitute the major obstacle to the revival of negotiations for the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.

Indeed, Israel's illegal actions continue to undermine any and all efforts to resume the peace process, including via direct negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, on the basis of the well-known parameters and within the time frame specified by the Quartet in its 23 September 2011 statement, a deadline that is quickly approaching with the rapid passage of months marked only by a lack of progress due to Israel's intransigence and the further deterioration and destabilization of the situation on the ground. Israel must be compelled to abandon its expansionism, colonization and aggression against the Palestinian people and their land and instead pursue peace and take the hand of peace outstretched to it by the Palestinian leadership.

Here, we reaffirm Palestine's commitment to a peaceful, just solution by echoing the words of President Mahmoud Abbas yesterday at the International Economic Forum held in Istanbul, Turkey, where he stated: "Our region needs bridges of cooperation, peace and dialogue rather than walls and settlement expansion", and further cautioned that time is running out for this historic peaceful compromise. We thus stress the urgency of serious, collective action to advance the achievement of the two-State solution based on the pre-1967 borders. On this forty-

fifth anniversary of the belligerent, military occupation, we call for the redoubling of efforts to bring an end to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian and other Arab lands, which requires an end and reversal of the illegal settlement campaign, and to realize the long overdue independence of the State of Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital, living side by side with Israel and all its neighbours in peace and security, and the just solution of all core final status issues.

Before concluding, I must draw your attention once again to the ongoing Palestinian prisoner crisis and particularly the grave situation of hunger-striking prisoners, including Mahmoud Al-Sarsak and Akram Al-Rekhmawi, to whom I referred in my letter of 4 June 2012. Al-Sarsak, now in his eightieth day of hunger strike and in rapidly deteriorating health, has been visited by independent doctors affiliated with Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, who have determined that he is at risk of immediate death and must be hospitalized. We renew our appeal to the international community to act on their moral and legal responsibilities to save his life and the lives of others being endangered by the occupying Power's repressive and brutal policies. It must be demanded that Israel respect all of its legal obligations, including under humanitarian and human rights law, vis-à-vis the Palestinian civilians, including children, that it continues to hold captive and that all prisoners and detainees being illegally held be released. Moreover, Israel must be demanded to respect the provisions of the agreement of 14 May 2012 aimed at alleviating the suffering and deplorable conditions being endured by Palestinian prisoners and detainees. This must include upholding the commitment not to renew administrative detentions without charge and to allow for visits by Palestinian families from the Gaza Strip.

The present letter is in follow-up to our previous 428 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 9 May 2012 (A/ES-10/556-S/2012/396) constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

United Nations A/66/827–S/2012/411

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda items 34, 35 and 39

Prevention of armed conflict

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

Letter dated 7 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the military forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan recorded for the months of January to April 2012 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34, 35 and 39, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Garen **Nazarian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 7 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan from 1 to 31 January 2012

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
1.	Eraskh	01.01.12 00.15	AK	7
2.	Tigranakert	01.01.12 00.20	AK	1
3.	Sevakavan	02.01.12 18.45	AK	3
4.	Tigranakert	03.01.12 23.00	AK	3
5.	Chinari	04.01.12 20.40	AK	60
6.	Movses	04.01.12 17.45	AK	2
7.	Vazashen	06.01.12 21.00	AK	3
8.	Paravaqar	07.01.12 16.20	AK	12
9.	Bakhanis	07.01.12 22.55	AK	6
10.	Movses	08.01.12 13.50	Machine gun 12.7 mm	8
11.	Movses	08.01.12 14.10	AK	10
12.	Movses	08.01.12 14.10	AK	15
13.	Movses	08.01.12 14.30	Machine gun 12.7 mm	14
14.	Vazashen	08.01.12 17.00	AK	3
15.	Eraskh	08.01.12 23.30	AK	2
16.	Aygepar	09.01.12 13.40	PK	3
17.	Aygepar	09.01.12 14.50	PK	4
18.	Eraskh	09.01.12 18.30	AK	2
19.	Aygepar	10.01.12 13.00	Machine gun 12.7 mm	4

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
20.	Aygepar	10.01.12 16.35	Machine gun 12.7 mm	4
21.	Movses	10.01.12 18.10	PK	10
22.	Movses	10.01.12 21.20	Machine gun 12.7 mm	5
23.	Paravaqar	13.01.12 14.00	AK	6
24.	Vazashen	15.01.12 20.15	PK	15
25.	Vazashen	16.01.12 11.20	SVD	2
26.	Aygepar	17.01.12 23.50	AK	7
27.	Berqaber	17.01.12 11.35	PK	1
28.	Aygepar	18.01.12 18.01	AK	9
29.	Aygepar	18.01.12 21.20	AK	8
30.	Vazashen	20.01.12 15.55	AK	5
31.	Vazashen	20.01.12 16.00	PK	10
32.	Eraskh	23.01.12 00.40	AK	2
33.	Kongur	23.01.12 15.00	Machine gun 12.7 mm	5
34.	Kongur	23.01.12 15.00	PK	10
35.	Aygepar	23.01.12 23.05	AK	7
36.	Berqaber	23.01.12 16.40	AK	2
37.	Vazashen	23.01.12 19.35	AK	10
38.	Vazashen	24.01.12 15.05	AK	3
39.	Chinari	25.01.12 13.35	AK	2
40.	Chinari	27.01.12 21.40	AK	5
41.	Chinari	27.01.12 21.40	PK	20

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
42.	Eraskh	29.01.12 19.40	AK	1
43.	Vazashen	31.01.12 22.55	AK	5
44.	Tigranakert	31.01.12 21.40	AK	1

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Armenia from 1 to 31 January 2012:

Number of violations — 44

Shots — about 320

PK ~ (73), SVD — (2), machine gun 12.7 mm ~ (40), AK ~ (202).

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh from 1 to 31 January 2012:

Number of violations — 456

Shots — about 3,820

PK ~ (451), SVD — (305), machine gun 12.7 mm ~ (1), sniper weapon 12.7 mm — (11), sniper weapon Istigal — (2), RPK — (28), AK ~ (3,022).

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan from 1 to 29 February 2012

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
45.	Berqaber	05.02.12 15.00	SVD	2
46.	Eraskh	05.02.12 17.00	PK	1
47.	Aygepar	07.02.12 23.10	AK	12
48.	Eraskh	07.02.12 15.10	AK	4
49.	Eraskh	07.02.12 15.40	SVD	3
50.	Sevakavan	08.02.12 15.15	AK	3
51.	Vazashen	10.02.12 19.30	AK	20
52.	Aygedzor	11.02.12 20.00	AK	20

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
53.	Kayanavan	11.02.12 19.25	AK	3
54.	Aygepar	13.02.12 20.30	AK	9
55.	Tigranakert	13.02.12 22.25	AK	1
56.	Voskevan	14.02.12 23.40	AK	5
57.	Mehrab	15.02.12 15.45	AK	3
58.	Vazashen	15.02.12 14.35	AK	3
59.	Mehrab	16.02.12 16.30	SVD	10
60.	Mehrab	16.02.12 16.30	AK	7
61.	Eraskh	17.02.12 06.00	AK	4
62.	Sevakavan	16.02.12 20.40	AK	2
63.	Aygedzor	18.02.12 13.10	AK	1
64.	Artsvaberd	22.02.12 12.45	PK	15
65.	Artsvaberd	22.02.12 12.45	AK	5
66.	Chinari	23.02.12 13.50	SVD	1
67.	Chinari	23.02.12 13.50	SVD	4
68.	Chinari	24.02.12 14.30-21.00	AK	60
69.	Chinari	25.02.12 10.30	AK	17
70.	Chinari	25.02.12 12.00	AK	40
71.	Chinari	25.02.12 12.25	AK	10
72.	Chinari	25.02.12 12.25	SVD	5
73.	Vazashen	26.02.12 00.40	AK	7
74.	Vazashen	26.02.12 00.40	PK	2

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
75.	Berdavan	25.02.12 14.40	AK	2
76.	Chinari	26.02.12 13.25	AK	10
77.	Chinari	26.02.12 13.25	Sniper 12.7 mm	8
78.	Chinari	26.02.12 16.40	Sniper 12.7 mm	3
79.	Chinari	26.02.12 17.00	Sniper 12.7 mm	8
80.	Movses	26.02.12 15.25	DSHK	6
81.	Nerqin Karmiraqhbyur	26.02.12 15.25	DSHK	17
82.	Movses	26.02.12 16.00	DSHK	3
83.	Nerqin Karmiraqhbyur	26.02.12 16.05	DSHK	3
84.	Chinari	26.02.12 16.40	DSHK	3
85.	Chinari	26.02.12 16.40	AK	3
86.	Nerqin Karmiraqhbyur	26.02.12 16.40	DSHK	3
87.	Nerqin Karmiraqhbyur	26.02.12 16.40	AK	3
88.	Aygepar	26.02.12 16.50	Sniper 12.7 mm	4
89.	Barekamavan	26.02.12 16.00	PK	5
90.	Aygepar	27.02.12 16.25	DSHK	4
91.	Chinari	28.02.12 13.20	SVD	4
92.	Chinari	28.02.12 21.00	AK	20
93.	Chinari	28.02.12 21.00	AK	6
94.	Sarigyuqh	28.02.12 10.40	SVD	2
95.	Aygepar	28.02.12 10.40	SVD	3
96.	Vazashen	28.02.12 14.05	PK	2

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
97.	Berdavan	28.02.12 08.20	AK	2
98.	Berdavan	28.02.12 15.40	PK	4
99.	Berdavan	28.02.12 15.40	SVD	3
100.	Berdavan	28.02.12 15.40	AK	5
101.	Doveqh	28.02.12 19.55	SVD	5
102.	Berdavan	28.02.12 20.30	AK	4
103.	Berdavan	28.02.12 20.55	AK	1
104.	Berdavan	29.02.12 02.45	AK	30
105.	Berdavan	29.02.12 04.00	AK	15

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Armenia from 1 to 29 February 2012:

Number of violations — 61

Shots — about 470

PK ~ (29), SVD — (42), Sniper weapon 12.7 mm ~ (23), AK ~ (337), DSHK ~ (39).

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh from 1 to 29 February 2012:

Number of violations — 770

Shots — about 3,710

PK ~ (486), SVD — (332), AK ~ (2,826), sniper weapon 12.7 mm — (36), machine gun 12.7 mm ~ (30).

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan from 1 to 31 March 2012

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
106.	Berdavan	01.03.12 02.25	AK	3
107.	Doveqh	01.03.12 12.40	SVD	6

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
108.	Berdavan	01.03.12 12.45	AK	5
109.	Berdavan	01.03.12 12.45	AK	12
110.	Movses	01.03.12 18.30	AK	8
111.	Berdavan	01.03.12 20.35	AK	2
112.	Chinari	02.03.12 23.30	AK	12
113.	Barcruni	02.03.12 13.30	PK	8
114.	Barcruni	02.03.12 13.30	Sniper 12.7 mm	3
115.	Chinari	03.03.12 18.45	Sniper 12.7 mm	2
116.	Berqaber	03.03.12 04.00	AK	30
117.	Sarigyuqh	03.03.12 22.10	AK	4
118.	Sarigyuqh	03.03.12 23.30	PK	4
119.	Chinari	04.03.12 18.00-18.20	PK	15
120.	Chinari	04.03.12 18.00-18.20	AK	15
121.	Kayanavan	04.03.12 13.05	AK	1
122.	Kayanavan	04.03.12 13.45	SVD	4
123.	Kiranc	04.03.12 21.50	PK	5
124.	Kayanavan	04.03.12 23.20	AK	8
125.	Berdavan	04.03.12 13.45	SVD	1
126.	Berdavan	04.03.12 17.40	AK	3
127.	Aygepar	05.03.12 17.00	AK	2
128.	Sarigyuqh	05.03.12 20.45	SVD	5
129.	Berqaber	06.03.12 01.10	AK	4

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
130.	Eraskhavan	05.03.12 21.35	PK	3
131.	Aygepar	06.03.12 13.55	AK	8
132.	Sarigyuqh	07.03.12 00.10	AK	2
133.	Mehrab	07.03.12 13.20	SVD	3
134.	Aygepar	07.03.12 10.25	AK	6
135.	Sarigyuqh	07.03.12 19.20	PK	12
136.	Berqaber	07.03.12 19.25	PK	15
137.	Aygehovit	07.03.12 22.40	AK	5
138.	Barcruni	07.03.12 17.30	AK	25
139.	Barcruni	07.03.12 17.30	PK	20
140.	Movses	08.03.12 12.15	AK	12
141.	Chinari	09.03.12 16.20	PK	8
142.	Paravaqar	09.03.12 15.00	AK	8
143.	Eraskhavan	09.03.12 23.40	AK	3
144.	Chinari	10.03.12 23.35	SVD	2
145.	Vazashen	10.03.12 22.20	PK	7
146.	Berqaber	11.03.12 00.45	AK	3
147.	Aygepar	11.03.12 17.35	AK	5
148.	Aygepar	11.03.12 18.30	AK	2
149.	Sarigyuqh	11.03.12 20.15	AK	8
150.	Eraskh	11.03.12 21.30	AK	2
151.	Eraskh	11.03.12 21.40	RPK	2

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
152.	Eraskh	11.03.12 21.40	AK	3
153.	Aygepar	12.03.12 11.45	AK	3
154.	Aygepar	12.03.12 12.15	AK	4
155.	Vazashen	13.03.12 00.50	DSHK	10
156.	Vazashen	13.03.12 00.50	AK	20
157.	Vazashen	13.03.12 00.50	PK	20
158.	Vazashen	13.03.12 01.50	AK	10
159.	Voskevan	12.03.12 13.00	AK	2
160.	Aygedzor	13.03.12 16.00	DSHK	12
161.	Aygepar	13.03.12 10.15	AK	1
162.	Aygepar	13.03.12 10.45	AK	5
163.	Berqaber	13.03.12 14.25	AK	2
164.	Berqaber	13.03.12 23.10	AK	6
165.	Barcruni	13.03.12 20.50	AK	40
166.	Barcruni	13.03.12 22.25	AK	30
167.	Barcruni	14.03.12 04.45	AK	250
168.	Vahan	14.03.12 13.00	Sniper 12.7 mm	2
169.	Chinari	14.03.12 09.40	SVD	1
170.	Berqaber	14.03.12 16.10	SVD	4
171.	Berqaber	14.03.12 17.15	Sniper 12.7 mm	1
172.	Berqaber	14.03.12 17.25	Sniper 12.7 mm	1
173.	Berqaber	14.03.12 18.45	AK	7

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
174.	Sevqar	14.03.12 19.20-19.30	AK	20
175.	Sevqar	14.03.12 19.20-19.30	PK	20
176.	Sevqar	14.03.12 19.20-19.30	SVD	10
177.	Berqaber	14.03.12 19.30	SVD	1
178.	Berqaber	14.03.12 20.40	DSHK	10
179.	Berqaber	14.03.12 20.50	AK	10
180.	Sevqar	14.03.12 22.30	AK	7
181.	Sevqar	14.03.12 22.30	AK	7
182.	Berqaber	14.03.12 23.40	AK	3
183.	Berqaber	15.03.12 00.30	AK	10
184.	Berqaber	15.03.12 00.30	SVD	1
185.	Voskepar	14.03.12 20.30	AK	3
186.	Voskepar	14.03.12 23.25	AK	2
187.	Qhachik	14.03.12 23.15	AK	7
188.	Mehrab	15.03.12 13.50	PK	50
189.	Chinari	15.03.12 17.00	SVD	3
190.	Paravaqar	15.03.12 13.30	SVD	4
191.	Paravaqar	15.03.12 19.05	AK	40
192.	Berqaber	15.03.12 10.20	Sniper 12.7 mm	7
193.	Berqaber	15.03.12 13.05	AK	2
194.	Sarigyukh	15.03.12 21.30	AK	10
195.	Berqaber	15.03.12 22.30	PK	30

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
196.	Barcruni	15.03.12 16.55	SVD	6
197.	Barcruni	15.03.12 16.55	PK	10
198.	Barcruni	15.03.12 17.55	Sniper 12.7 mm	3
199.	Aygedzor	16.03.12 15.30-16.30	SVD	15
200.	Aygedzor	16.03.12 15.30-16.30	PK	25
201.	Aygedzor	16.03.12 15.30-16.30	PK	25
202.	Aygedzor	16.03.12 15.30-16.30	SVD	15
203.	Aygepar	16.03.12 15.45	AK	25
204.	Movses	16.03.12 15.45	AK	4
205.	Aygepar	16.03.12 15.45	PK	10
206.	Aygepar	16.03.12 17.00	AK	2
207.	Aygepar	16.03.12 17.40	AK	4
208.	Aygepar	16.03.12 19.40	AK	12
209.	Azatamut	16.03.12 14.30	AK	3
210.	Vazashen	16.03.12 20.15	AK	1
211.	Vazashen	16.03.12 20.35	AK	3
212.	Barekamavan	16.03.12 14.25	RPK	2
213.	Vazashen	17.03.12 07.35	AK	3
214.	Berqaber	17.03.12 17.30	PK	30
215.	Berqaber	17.03.12 18.10	PK	5
216.	Berqaber	18.03.12 05.40	AK	15
217.	Agarak	17.03.12 13.30	AK	5

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
218.	Chinari	18.03.12 14.00	PK	10
219.	Chinari	18.03.12 14.00	SVD	5
220.	Sarigyuqh	18.03.12 17.00	PK	16
221.	Sarigyuqh	18.03.12 17.00	SVD	20
222.	Sevakavan	18.03.12 22.40	AK	2
223.	Eraskh	18.03.12 23.45	AK	2
224.	Chinari	19.03.12 21.00	AK	12
225.	Chinari	19.03.12 21.00	PK	4
226.	Aygedzor	19.03.12 21.00	AK	25
227.	Aygepar	19.03.12 13.30	AK	2
228.	Aygepar	19.03.12 13.35	AK	2
229.	Aygepar	19.03.12 16.30	AK	2
230.	Aygepar	19.03.12 16.30	Sniper 12.7 mm	2
231.	Aygepar	19.03.12 17.20	Sniper 12.7 mm	2
232.	Movses	19.03.12 22.25	AK	20
233.	Aygepar	20.03.12 01.40	AK	3
234.	Azatamut	19.03.12 16.50	SVD	2
235.	Vazashen	19.03.12 19.35	AK	1
236.	Vazashen	19.03.12 19.35	AK	2
237.	Vazashen	19.03.12 20.20	AK	7
238.	Vazashen	19.03.12 20.20	PK	30
239.	Vazashen	19.03.12 22.35	AK	1

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
240.	Berdavan	19.03.12 14.20	SVD	1
241.	Berdavan	19.03.12 14.30	SVD	4
242.	Berdavan	19.03.12 14.30	AK	60
243.	Barekamavan	19.03.12 19.10	SVD	4
244.	Vahan	19.03.12 19.30	AK	100
245.	Mauntein Gamish	20.03.12 11.20	AK	100
246.	Mauntein Gamish	20.03.12 11.20	PK	100
247.	Aygepar	20.03.12 23.35	AK	2
248.	Aygepar	21.03.12 04.25	AK	6
249.	Berqaber	20.03.12 16.00	AK	2
250.	Berqaber	20.03.12 16.00	SVD	1
251.	Kirantc	20.03.12 19.30	SVD	10
252.	Kirantc	20.03.12 19.30	PK	30
253.	Aygehovit	20.03.12 20.50	PK	15
254.	Vazashen	20.03.12 21.50	AK	1
255.	Vazashen	20.03.12 21.50	AK	6
256.	Vazashen	20.03.12 21.50	AK	3
257.	Vazashen	20.03.12 21.50	AK	1
258.	Vazashen	20.03.12 22.40	AK	6
259.	Aygehovit	21.03.12 01.05	PK	5
260.	Berdavan	20.03.12 22.45	SVD	4
261.	Areni	20.03.12 21.20	AK	1

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
262.	Chinari	21.03.12 12.20	Sniper 12.7 mm	7
263.	Movses	21.03.12 11.20	DSHK	10
264.	Movses	21.03.12 11.30	DSHK	4
265.	Berqaber	21.03.12 13.35	PK	10
266.	Vazashen	21.03.12 20.20	PK	30
267.	Vazashen	21.03.12 20.30	PK	10
268.	Barekamavan	21.03.12 10.35	SVD	2
269.	Chinari	22.03.12 12.15	AK	1
270.	Chinari	22.03.12 18.30	AK	30
271.	Aygedzor	22.03.12 20.15	PK	20
272.	Vazashen	23.03.12 00.30	AK	18
273.	Chinari	23.03.12 18.30	AK	2
274.	Aygehovit	23.03.12 19.35	AK	2
275.	Vazashen	23.03.12 23.50	AK	1
276.	Azatamwut	24.03.12 00.30	AK	1
277.	Azatamwut	24.03.12 00.50	AK	1
278.	Paravaqar	24.03.12 02.20	PK	2
279.	Voskevan	23.03.12 08.10	AK	2
280.	Eraskh	23.03.12 22.40	AK	1
281.	Eraskh	23.03.12 23.50	AK	1
282.	Eraskh	23.03.12 23.55	AK	3
283.	Barcruni	23.03.12 21.40	SVD	1

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
284.	Movses	24.03.12 14.50	AK	4
285.	Movses	24.03.12 15.20	AK	1
286.	Movses	24.03.12 15.50	AK	6
287.	Movses	24.03.12 15.50	AK	4
288.	Movses	24.03.12 16.25	AK	50
289.	Nerqin Karmiraqhbyur	24.03.12 16.25	PK	6
290.	Movses	24.03.12 17.25	Sniper 12.7 mm	7
291.	Movses	24.03.12 17.25	Sniper 12.7 mm	6
292.	Movses	24.03.12 17.50	Sniper 12.7 mm	7
293.	Berqaber	24.03.12 17.00	AK	2
294.	Berqaber	24.03.12 17.00	DSHK	1
295.	Vazashen	24.03.12 20.15	AK	2
296.	Aygehovit	24.03.12 21.35	AK	2
297.	Aygehovit	24.03.12 21.40	AK	15
298.	Berqaber	24.03.12 22.00	AK	4
299.	Berqaber	24.03.12 22.30	AK	1
300.	Berqaber	24.03.12 22.50	AK	1
301.	Berqaber	24.03.12 22.55	AK	2
302.	Berqaber	24.03.12 23.00	AK	2
303.	Berqaber	24.03.12 23.15	PK	20
304.	Aygehovit	25.03.12 00.40	SVD	1
305.	Berdavan	24.03.12 16.00	AK	2

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
306.	Eraskh	24.03.12 16.50	AK	2
307.	Eraskh	24.03.12 17.20	AK	4
308.	Eraskh	24.03.12 18.00	AK	1
309.	Eraskh	24.03.12 18.55	AK	6
310.	Eraskh	24.03.12 19.05	AK	2
311.	Eraskh	24.03.12 19.35	AK	1
312.	Eraskh	24.03.12 19.50	SVD	1
313.	Eraskh	24.03.12 20.15	AK	5
314.	Eraskh	24.03.12 20.40	Sniper 12.7 mm	1
315.	Eraskh	24.03.12 21.00	RPG	1
316.	Eraskh	24.03.12 23.50	AK	4
317.	Barcruni	24.03.12 22.15	SVD	4
318.	Barcruni	24.03.12 22.15	Sniper 12.7 mm	2
319.	Agarak	24.03.12 19.15	AK	4
320.	Agarak	24.03.12 19.15	PK	20
321.	Aygepar	25.03.12 13.15	AK	3
322.	Paravaqar	25.03.12 16.00	AK	5
323.	Aygehovit	25.03.12 12.55	AK	9
324.	Berqaber	25.03.12 23.20	AK	1
325.	Berqaber	25.03.12 23.50	AK	10
326.	Berqaber	25.03.12 23.50	PK	12
327.	Berqaber	26.03.12 00.05	PK	8

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
328.	Berqaber	26.03.12 00.10	PK	6
329.	Berqaber	26.03.12 00.10	PK	13
330.	Vazashen	26.03.12 00.25	PK	35
331.	Berdavan	25.03.12 09.05	SVD	1
332.	Berdavan	25.03.12 10.25	SVD	2
333.	Voskevan	25.03.12 17.50	SVD	1
334.	Voskevan	25.03.12 17.50	AK	1
335.	Voskevan	25.03.12 18.03	AK	6
336.	Eraskh	25.03.12 21.35	AK	4
337.	Eraskh	25.03.12 21.37	AK	1
338.	Eraskh	25.03.12 21.42	AK	1
339.	Eraskh	25.03.12 22.00	AK	32
340.	Eraskh	25.03.12 22.06	AK	1
341.	Agarak	25.03.12 11.50	SVD	2
342.	Agarak	25.03.12 12.15	Sniper 12.7 mm	2
343.	Berdavan	26.03.12 12.50	PK	1
344.	Berdavan	26.03.12 13.45	AK	1
345.	Kayanavan	26.03.12 17.45	AK	1
346.	Kayanavan	26.03.12 18.40	AK	2
347.	Berqaber	27.03.12 01.30	AK	7
348.	Eraskh	26.03.12 19.35	AK	3
349.	Eraskh	26.03.12 19.45	AK	8

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
350.	Eraskh	26.03.12 19.50	AK	2
351.	Eraskh	26.03.12 20.17	AK	3
352.	Eraskh	26.03.12 20.17	AK	1
353.	Eraskh	26.03.12 20.18	AK	3
354.	Eraskh	26.03.12 20.25	AK	4
355.	Eraskh	26.03.12 22.25	AK	1
356.	Agarak	26.03.12 11.45	SVD	2
357.	Agarak	26.03.12 15.40	PK	7
358.	Agarak	26.03.12 16.15	PK	2
359.	Agarak	26.03.12 18.40	PK	2
360.	Agarak	26.03.12 19.00	PK	1
361.	Agarak	26.03.12 21.30	AK	2
362.	Agarak	26.03.12 21.55	AK	2
363.	Agarak	26.03.12 22.25	AK	2
364.	Berqaber	27.03.12 07.20	AK	1
365.	Sevqar	27.03.12 19.15	AK	2
366.	Berqaber	27.03.12 20.30	AK	1
367.	Sevqar	27.03.12 21.15	AK	1
368.	Berqaber	27.03.12 22.00	SVD	2
369.	Sevqar	27.03.12 22.05	AK	1
370.	Eraskh	27.03.12 11.35	AK	30
371.	Eraskh	27.03.12 11.35	RPK	30

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
372.	Agarak	27.03.12 10.40	AK	2
373.	Agarak	27.03.12 14.45	Sniper 12.7 mm	7
374.	Agarak	27.03.12 14.45	AK	6
375.	Chinari	28.03.12 14.50	SVD	11
376.	Aygepar	28.03.12 12.00	AK	2
377.	N. Karmiraqhbyur	28.03.12 15.00	AK	4
378.	N. Karmiraqhbyur	29.03.12 00.00	AK	6
379.	Movses	29.03.12 00.00	AK	10
380.	ʏygehovit	28.03.12 07.40	AK	2
381.	Sarigyuqh	28.03.12 08.10	SVD	1
382.	Aygehovit	28.03.12 08.30	SVD	1
383.	Sarigyuqh	28.03.12 11.00	AK	2
384.	Berqaber	29.03.12 01.20	AK	2
385.	Voskevan	28.03.12 13.00	SVD	5
386.	Voskevan	28.03.12 15.00	SVD	2
387.	Voskevan	28.03.12 18.50	AK	10
388.	Voskevan	28.03.12 18.50	SVD	7
389.	Eraskh	28.03.12 18.10	AK	1
390.	Agarak	28.03.12 09.35	AK	3
391.	Agarak	28.03.12 12.45	SVD	1
392.	Agarak	28.03.12 12.45	AK	16
393.	Agarak	28.03.12 12.45	AK	3

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
394.	Agarak	28.03.12 15.20	AK	1
395.	Agarak	28.03.12 16.05	PK	1
396.	Agarak	28.03.12 16.50	PK	18
397.	Agarak	28.03.12 20.00	AK	4
398.	Agarak	28.03.12 20.05	AK	2
399.	Agarak	28.03.12 20.25	AK	1
400.	Agarak	28.03.12 20.25	AK	1
401.	Agarak	28.03.12 21.55	AK	1
402.	Chinari	29.03.12 18.55	PK	15
403.	Chinari	29.03.12 18.55	DSHK	2
404.	Chinari	30.03.12 00.20	SVD	1
405.	Movses	29.03.12 23.25	AK	3
406.	Movses	29.03.12 23.25	AK	3
407.	Movses	29.03.12 23.50	AK	12
408.	Movses	29.03.12 23.50	AK	15
409.	Berqaber	29.03.12 10.40	PK	5
410.	Berqaber	29.03.12 10.40	DSHK	2
411.	Berqaber	29.03.12 17.35	SVD	1
412.	Vazashen	29.03.12 20.35	AK	3
413.	Berqaber	29.03.12 21.00	AK	9
414.	Berqaber	29.03.12 22.50	AK	6
415.	Berqaber	29.03.12 22.50	PK	4

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
416.	Berqaber	29.03.12 22.50	DSHK	5
417.	Voskepar	29.03.12 10.05	AK	7
418.	Eraskh	29.03.12 13.20	AK	2
419.	Movses	30.03.12 14.20	Sniper 12.7 mm	12
420.	Paravaqar	30.03.12 22.00	AK	5
421.	Berqaber	30.03.12 08.10	SVD	1
422.	Agarak	30.03.12 12.00	SVD	2
423.	Paravaqar	31.03.12 19.25	AK	10
424.	Paravaqar	31.03.12 19.30	AK	10
425.	Paravaqar	31.03.12 19.30	DSHK	20
426.	Sarigyuqh	31.03.12 19.40	AK	2
427.	Sarigyuqh	31.03.12 20.35	AK	2
428.	Vazashen	31.03.12 21.20	PK	3
429.	Berqaber	31.03.12 21.30	AK	4
430.	Sarigyuqh	31.03.12 23.20	AK	3
431.	Sarigyuqh	31.03.12 23.20	DSHK	3
432.	Berqaber	31.03.12 23.20	DSHK	3

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Armenia from 1 to 31 March 2012:

Number of violations — 327

Shots — about 2,823

PK ~ (783), SVD — (184), sniper weapon 12.7 mm ~ (74), AK ~ (1,665), DSHK ~ (82), RPK ~ (34), RPG — (1).

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh from 1 to 31 March 2012:

Number of violations — 1,112

Shots — about 5,623

PK ~ (997), SVD — (451), AK ~ (4,096), sniper weapon 12.7 mm — (65), machine gun 12.7 mm ~ (11), RPK ~ (2), RPG — (1).

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan from 1 to 30 April 2012

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
433.	Chinari	01.04.12 23.10	SVD	5
434.	Berqaber	02.04.12 00.25	SVD	4
435.	Chinari	02.04.12 17.00	AK	14
436.	Aygedzor	02.04.12 21.30	DSHK	3
437.	Chinari	02.04.12 22.20	SVD	2
438.	Sevqar	02.04.12 21.35	AK	1
439.	Berqaber	02.04.12 21.40	AK	4
440.	Berqaber	02.04.12 23.45	SVD	1
441.	Berqaber	03.04.12 01.10	PK	50
442.	Barekamavan	02.04.12 10.25	SVD	2
443.	Barekamavan	02.04.12 11.15	SVD	1
444.	Chinari	03.04.12 14.20	Sniper 12.7 mm	14
445.	Chinari	03.04.12 17.00	Sniper 12.7 mm	1
446.	Sevqar	03.04.12 19.00	DSHK	6
447.	Sevqar	03.04.12 23.30	AK	3
448.	Barcruni	03.04.12 14.20	SVD	4
449.	Barcruni	03.04.12 16.50	Sniper 12.7 mm	4
450.	Barcruni	03.04.12 17.20	Sniper 12.7 mm	3

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
451.	Mehrab	04.04.12 11.40	SVD	2
452.	Chinari	04.04.12 15.00	PK	16
453.	Chinari	04.04.12 15.00	AK	30
454.	Vazashen	04.04.12 18.40	AK	4
455.	Vazashen	04.04.12 21.30	AK	6
456.	Barekamavan	04.04.12 11.00	SVD	2
457.	Baqhanis	04.04.12 13.10	AK	10
458.	Barcruni	04.04.12 14.30- Å.15.00	Sniper 12.7 mm	10
459.	Chinari	05.04.12 12.25	SVD	4
460.	Chinari	05.04.12 12.40	Sniper 12.7 mm	3
461.	Chinari	05.04.12 13.40	SVD	4
462.	Mehrab	05.04.12 19.30	AK	4
463.	Movses	05.04.12 17.40	AK	2
464.	Sarigyuqh	05.04.12 15.05	AK	15
465.	Sarigyuqh	05.04.12 15.15	AK	5
466.	Berqaber	05.04.12 19.40	AK	3
467.	Berqaber	05.04.12 19.40	SVD	3
468.	Berqaber	05.04.12 19.40	AK	4
469.	Chinari	06.04.12 18.25	Sniper 12.7 mm	10
470.	N. Karmiraqhbyur	06.04.12 19.45	PK	15
471.	Kiranc	06.04.12 22.00	AK	15
472.	Berqaber	06.04.12 23.40	DSHK	15

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
473.	Berqaber	06.04.12 23.40	AK	10
474.	Berqaber	06.04.12 23.40	PK	8
475.	Berqaber	06.04.12 23.40	SVD	2
476.	Sevakavan	07.04.12 21.15	AK	4
477.	Chinari	08.04.12 17.15	SVD	2
478.	Chinari	08.04.12 22.00	SVD	1
479.	Chinari	08.04.12 22.00	DSHK	3
480.	Paravaqar	08.04.12 12.30	PK	15
481.	Paravaqar	08.04.12 12.30	AK	10
482.	Baqhanis	08.04.12 16.55	AK	3
483.	Barcruni	08.04.12 22.35	PK	20
484.	Barcruni	08.04.12 22.35	SVD	10
485.	Barcruni	08.04.12 22.35	AK	10
486.	Chinari	09.04.12 17.55	AK	2
487.	Movses	09.04.12 21.15	AK	5
488.	Movses	09.04.12 21.25	AK	5
489.	Azatamut	09.04.12 22.30	AK	9
490.	Sarigyuqh	09.04.12 23.40	SVD	3
491.	Aygedzor	10.04.12 09.10	Sniper 12.7 mm	12
492.	Chinari	10.04.12 12.20	AK	1
493.	Chinari	10.04.12 18.20	AK	4
494.	Mehrab	10.04.12 19.15-20.00	AK	10

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
495.	Mehrab	10.04.12 19.15-20.00	SVD	10
496.	Chinari	10.04.12 18.30	SVD	3
497.	Movses	10.04.12 17.45	DSHK	15
498.	Berqaber	10.04.12 08.10	PK	2
499.	Berqaber	10.04.12 08.10	AK	20
500.	Vazashen	10.04.12 14.40	AK	18
501.	Vazashen	10.04.12 18.00	AK	6
502.	Berqaber	10.04.12 17.55	SVD	1
503.	Berqaber	10.04.12 19.15	SVD	4
504.	Kayanavan	10.04.12 19.50	AK	5
505.	Kayanavan	10.04.12 19.50	SVD	10
506.	Barekamavan	10.04.12 19.10	PK	15
507.	Barcruni	10.04.12 20.40	Sniper 12.7 mm	4
508.	Barcruni	10.04.12 22.10	Sniper 12.7 mm	3
509.	Agarak	10.04.12 14.30	AK	2
510.	Agarak	10.04.12 14.35	AK	3
511.	Agarak	10.04.12 15.25	AK	1
512.	Agarak	10.04.12 16.40	AK	15
513.	Agarak	10.04.12 16.40	PK	15
514.	Agarak	10.04.12 16.55	AK	30
515.	Agarak	10.04.12 17.30	PK	35
516.	Aygedzor	11.04.12 18.30	PK	20

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
517.	Chinari	11.04.12 19.30	SVD	3
518.	Vazashen	11.04.12 21.05	AK	15
519.	Vazashen	11.04.12 21.05	PK	30
520.	Berqaber	11.04.12 21.10	AK	12
521.	Berqaber	12.04.12 03.45	AK	30
522.	Berqaber	12.04.12 03.45	PK	70
523.	Berqaber	12.04.12 03.50	PK	20
524.	Berqaber	12.04.12 03.50	DSHK	3
525.	Berqaber	12.04.12 03.50	PK	15
526.	Berqaber	12.04.12 03.50	DSHK	4
527.	Berqaber	12.04.12 03.40	PK	15
528.	Berdavan	11.04.12 20.10	AK	2
529.	Barcruni	11.04.12 09.10	Sniper 12.7 mm	4
530.	Barcruni	11.04.12 09.30	Sniper 12.7 mm	5
531.	Barcruni	11.04.12 11.10	Sniper 12.7 mm	3
532.	Barcruni	11.04.12 11.55	Sniper 12.7 mm	5
533.	Agarak	11.04.12 10.55	NSVT	5
534.	Agarak	12.04.12 00.50	AK	3
535.	Agarak	12.04.12 01.10	AK	10
536.	Varavar	12.04.12 19.30	PK	20
537.	Bozlu	13.04.12 02.00	SVD	10
538.	Bozlu	13.04.12 02.00	PK	60

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
539.	Chinari	13.04.12 12.40	SVD	3
540.	Chinari	13.04.12 18.50	SVD	10
541.	Movses	13.04.12 12.40	AK	7
542.	Movses	13.04.12 14.55	AK	10
543.	Paravaqar	13.04.12 22.55	PK	4
544.	Paravaqar	13.04.12 23.00	AK	4
545.	Eraskh	13.04.12 16.00	AK	1
546.	Bozlu	14.04.12 10.00	SVD	40
547.	Chinari	14.04.12 21.30	AK	20
548.	Aygepar	14.04.12 13.10	AK	35
549.	Berqaber	14.04.12 17.35	SVD	10
550.	Barcruni	14.04.12 14.00	SVD	4
551.	Barcruni	14.04.12 14.00	Sniper 12.7 mm	1
552.	Barcruni	14.04.12 15.25	AK	30
553.	Barcruni	14.04.12 15.25	Sniper 12.7 mm	11
554.	Khndzorout	14.04.12 22.10	AK	6
555.	Khndzorout	14.04.12 22.15	AK	21
556.	Arcvaberd	15.04.12 11.05	SVD	6
557.	Khndzorout	15.04.12 19.15	AK	4
558.	Vazashen	16.04.12 23.50	SVD	2
559.	Voskepar	16.04.12 22.40	AK	4
560.	Sevakavan	16.04.12 14.10	AK	4

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
561.	Tigranashen	16.04.12 21.20	AK	1
562.	Voskepar	17.04.12 14.30	AK	4
563.	Eraskh	18.04.12 14.35	AK	1
564.	Chinari	18.04.12 14.30-15.00	AK	7
565.	Chinari	18.04.12 14.30-15.00	SVD	1
566.	Chinari	18.04.12 14.30-15.00	SVD	7
567.	Tigranakert	18.04.12 21.05	AK	2
568.	Sevakavan	18.04.12 22.50	AK	4
569.	Aygedzor	19.04.12 14.15	AK	4
570.	Aygedzor	19.04.12 18.45	AK	25
571.	Movses	19.04.12 21.10	AK	25
572.	Berqaber	20.04.12 00.20	AK	20
573.	Voskevan	20.04.12 18.15	AK	1
574.	Sevakavan	20.04.12 21.10	AK	1
575.	Sevakavan	20.04.12 21.30	AK	1
576.	Sevakavan	20.04.12 23.50	AK	4
577.	Khndzorout	20.04.12 10.35	AK	7
578.	Khndzorout	20.04.12 22.05	AK	1
579.	Khndzorout	20.04.12 22.25	AK	7
580.	Mehrab	21.04.12 14.30	SVD	3
581.	Chinari	21.04.12 15.30	RPK	40
582.	Voskepar	21.04.12 16.40	AK	35

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
583.	Movses	22.04.12 17.15	AK	7
584.	Vazashen	22.04.12 13.35	SVD	3
585.	Voskepar	22.04.12 15.10	AK	2
586.	Barekamavan	22.04.12 15.10	Sniper 12.7 mm	2
587.	Khndzorout	22.04.12 23.00	AK	12
588.	Chinari	23.04.12 12.15	AK	6
589.	Aygepar	23.04.12 18.50	AK	1
590.	Berqaber	23.04.12 21.55	AK	2
591.	Berqaber	23.04.12 21.55	AK	2
592.	Berqaber	23.04.12 21.55	AK	1
593.	Berdavan	23.04.12 19.20	PK	2
594.	Berdavan	23.04.12 23.05	AK	2
595.	Tigranakert	23.04.12 21.15	AK	1
596.	Tigranakert	23.04.12 21.55	PK	20
597.	Tigranakert	23.04.12 22.40	PK	5
598.	Tigranakert	23.04.12 23.10	SVD	5
599.	Tigranakert	23.04.12 23.40	AK	5
600.	Eraskh	24.04.12 00.40	PK	3
601.	Barcruni	23.04.12 18.00	AK	6
602.	Khndzorout	23.04.12 21.20	AK	50
603.	Khndzorout	23.04.12 21.20	PK	10
604.	Chinari	24.04.12 17.30	AK	2

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
605.	Chinari	24.04.12 17.30	SVD	2
606.	Chinari	25.04.12 00.10	PK	20
607.	Chinari	25.04.12 00.10	SVD	7
608.	Chinari	25.04.12 01.20	AK	6
609.	Chinari	25.04.12 01.20	SVD	2
610.	Chinari	24.04.12 19.40-20.00	PK	150
611.	Chinari	24.04.12 19.40-20.00	SVD	77
612.	Chinari	24.04.12 19.40-20.00	AK	550
613.	Chinari	24.04.12 21.25	AK	30
614.	Movses	24.04.12 21.20	AK	15
615.	Movses	24.04.12 21.20	AK	15
616.	Aygehovit	24.04.12 22.40	AK	10
617.	Aygehovit	24.04.12 22.40	SVD	4
618.	Khndzorout	24.04.12 21.55	AK	12
619.	Chinari	28.04.12 18.20	PK	20
620.	Chinari	28.04.12 18.20	SVD	10
621.	Chinari	28.04.12 18.20	SVD	10
622.	Movses	25.04.12 16.00	DSHK	15
623.	Movses	25.04.12 16.00	PK	12
624.	Movses	25.04.12 16.00	AK	20
625.	Doveqh	25.04.12 12.00	PK	170
626.	Doveqh	25.04.12 12.00	AK	100

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
627.	Doveqh	25.04.12 12.00	SVD	10
628.	Doveqh	25.04.12 12.00	Sniper 12.7 mm	20
629.	Doveqh	25.04.12 19.45	SVD	15
630.	Doveqh	25.04.12 19.45	SVD	10
631.	Chinari	26.04.12 14.20	AK	3
632.	Chinari	26.04.12 21.30	AK	5
633.	Chinari	27.04.12 00.20	SVD	10
634.	Paravaqar	26.04.12 08.20	AK	1
635.	Vazashen	26.04.12 21.15	AK	15
636.	Vazashen	26.04.12 21.15	PK	15
637.	Koti	26.04.12 21.15	AK	13
638.	Barcruni	26.04.12 15.30	Sniper 12.7 mm	2
639.	Barcruni	26.04.12 17.40	Sniper 12.7 mm	4
640.	Chinari	27.04.12 16.30	PK	30
641.	Chinari	27.04.12 22.00	PK	15
642.	Movses	27.04.12 14.20	Sniper 12.7 mm	20
643.	Movses	27.04.12 14.20	PK	100
644.	Movses	27.04.12 14.20	AK	50
645.	Aygepar	27.04.12 16.00	AK	8
646.	Paravaqar	27.04.12 19.50	AK	6
647.	Aygepar	27.04.12 22.25	PK	70
648.	Aygepar	27.04.12 22.30	Sniper 12.7 mm	10

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
649.	Aygepar	27.04.12 22.30	PK	35
650.	Karmiraqhbyur	27.04.12 23.30	AK	10
651.	Aygepar	28.04.12 01.55	PK	15
652.	Utiq	28.04.12 01.55	PK	15
653.	Kiranc	27.04.12 21.10	PK	10
654.	Eraskh	27.04.12 13.45	AK	1
655.	Barcruni	27.04.12 15.40	Sniper 12.7 mm	1
656.	Barcruni	27.04.12 15.40	SVD	1
657.	Vagravar	27.04.12 18.40	Sniper 12.7 mm	1
658.	Vagravar	27.04.12 18.40	PK	30
659.	Chinari	28.04.12 19.45	AK	30
660.	Chinari	28.04.12 22.50-23.20	DSHK	40
661.	Chinari	28.04.12 22.50-23.20	AK	360
662.	N. Karmiraqhbyur	28.04.12 21.55	AK	10
663.	Aygepar	28.04.12 23.15	DSHK	2
664.	Aygepar	28.04.12 23.15	PK	10
665.	Aygepar	28.04.12 23.15	PK	5
666.	Movses	28.04.12 23.15	AK	120
667.	Movses	28.04.12 23.50	AK	120
668.	Aygepar	28.04.12 23.50	AK	50
669.	Aygepar	29.04.12 00.05	AK	15
670.	Berqaber	28.04.12 19.00	AK	10

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
671.	Berqaber	29.04.12 02.05	AK	2
672.	Berqaber	29.04.12 02.05	AK	5
673.	Berqaber	28.04.12 23.40	AK	2
674.	Barekamavan	28.04.12 11.30	SVD	1
675.	Barcruni	28.04.12 22.35	AK	6
676.	Agarak	28.04.12 19.55	AK	1
677.	Chinari	29.04.12 19.00	AK	10
678.	Aygepar	29.04.12 21.25	AK	7
679.	Aygepar	29.04.12 23.20	DSHK	
680.	Aygepar	29.04.12 23.20	PK	25
681.	Aygepar	29.04.12 23.45-00.50	PK	180
682.	Aygepar	29.04.12 23.45-00.50	DSHK	95
683.	Movses	30.04.12 00.50-01.10	DSHK	75
684.	Movses	30.04.12 01.15-01.35	AK	120
685.	Movses	30.04.12 01.15-01.35	PK	200
686.	N. Karmiraqhbyur	30.04.12 01.50	DSHK	10
687.	N. Karmiraqhbyur	30.04.12 01.35	DSHK	25
688.	N. Karmiraqhbyur	30.04.12 01.50	RPK	70
689.	N. Karmiraqhbyur	30.04.12 01.50	PK	210
690.	Aygepar	30.04.12 02.10	PK	60
691.	Aygepar	30.04.12 02.10	DSHK	30
692.	N. Karmiraqhbyur	30.04.12 02.10	PK	80

Number	Direction	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
693.	N. Karmiraqhbyur	30.04.12 02.10	AK	15
694.	N. Karmiraqhbyur	30.04.12 02.10	PK	100
695.	Berdavan	29.04.12 11.25	AK	2
696.	Barcruni	29.04.12 13.10-13.30	PK	50
697.	Barcruni	29.04.12 13.10-13.30	SVD	10
698.	Barcruni	29.04.12 13.10-13.30	AK	38
699.	Barcruni	29.04.12 13.10-13.30	Sniper 12.7 mm	2
700.	Vahan	30.04.12 12.00	AK	3
701.	Chinari	30.04.12 14.30	SVD	10
702.	Chinari	30.04.12 17.20	AK	10
703.	Chinari	30.04.12 17.20	SVD	10
704.	Chinari	30.04.12 17.45	PK	20
705.	Chinari	30.04.12 17.45	SVD	15
706.	Chinari	30.04.12 20.45	AK	30
707.	Chinari	30.04.12 21.05	SVD	5
708.	Chinari	30.04.12 22.35	SVD	2
709.	Chinari	30.04.12 23.00	SVD	4
710.	Movses	30.04.12 14.15	AK	1
711.	Vazashen	30.04.12 11.00	AK	3
712.	Goqhaz	30.04.12 18.55	PK	20
713.	Aygehovit	30.04.12 20.15	AK	7
714.	Aygehovit	30.04.12 20.15	SVD	1

			Firing from Azerbaijani side	
Number	*Direction*	*Date, time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*
715.	Koti	30.04.12 16.30	DSHK	3
716.	Barekamavan	30.04.12 20.15	PK	16
717.	Barekamavan	30.04.12 20.15	AK	7
718.	Barekamavan	30.04.12 20.15	SVD	2
719.	Barekamavan	30.04.12 20.15	PK	16
720.	Barekamavan	30.04.12 20.15	AK	4
721.	Barekamavan	30.04.12 20.15	SVD	1
722.	Barekamavan	30.04.12 20.15	PK	8
723.	Barekamavan	30.04.12 20.15	AK	5
724.	Barekamavan	30.04.12 20.15	SVD	2
725.	Barekamavan	30.04.12 21.30	AK	6
726.	Barekamavan	30.04.12 21.40	PK	40
727.	Barcruni	30.04.12 17.20	SVD	4

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Armenia from 1 to 30 April 2012:

Number of violations — 295

Shots — about 5,900

PK ~ (2,232), SVD — (412), sniper weapon 12.7 mm ~ (155), AK ~ (2,629), DSHK ~ (346), RPK ~ (110), NSVT — (5).

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh from 1 to 30 April 2012:

Number of violations — 1,439

Shots — about 6,983

PK ~ (784), SVD — (902), AK ~ (5,200), DSHK ~ (38), RPK ~ (20), sniper weapon 12.7 mm — (19), sniper weapon 14.5 mm — (16), RPG — (1), Utyos ~ (3).

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Report of the Secretary-General on Eritrea

I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 19 of its resolution 2023 (2011), adopted on 5 December 2011, the Security Council requested me to report within 180 days on Eritrea's compliance with the provisions of the resolution and resolutions 1844 (2008), 1862 (2009) and 1907 (2009).

2. A note verbale was subsequently transmitted to the Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations, on 18 April 2012, requesting information from the Government by 2 May 2012 on the fulfilment of the provisions contained in resolution 2023 (2011).

3. On 2 May 2012, the Government of Eritrea submitted a report on its compliance with resolution 2023 (2011) to the Secretariat.

II. Background and key developments since my previous report on Eritrea (S/2010/327)

4. In adopting resolution 2023 (2011), the Security Council reinforced the existing sanctions regime on Eritrea as established under resolution 1907 (2009) for its destabilizing role in the Somalia conflict and for its failure to comply with resolution 1862 (2009), on its border dispute with Djibouti. The resolution imposed a two-way arms embargo (import and export), a travel ban and an assets freeze. Resolution 2023 (2011) expanded the sanctions to include the "diaspora tax", a 2 per cent income tax levied on Eritrean nationals living abroad, and the mining sector. The Council called on Eritrea to stop the use of the "diaspora tax" to support, directly or indirectly, armed opposition groups in violation of resolutions 1844 (2008) and 1862 (2009). In this regard, the resolution required Eritrea to cease using extortion, threats of violence, fraud and other illicit means to collect taxes outside Eritrea from its national or other individuals of Eritrean descent. The resolution also requested Member States to hold accountable individuals in their territory who were engaged in those activities on behalf of the Eritrean Government or the ruling People's Front for Democracy and Justice.

5. With regard to the mining sector, the resolution called on Eritrea to show transparency in its public finances in order to demonstrate that the proceeds of mining activities were not being used to destabilize the region, in violation of

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resolutions 1844 (2008), 1862 (2009) and 1907 (2009). Member States were required to exercise vigilance to ensure that funds derived from the mining sector did not contribute to violations of the sanctions regime. In this regard, the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, with the assistance of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, was requested to draft due diligence guidelines for use by Member States.

6. Finally, the resolution called for the release of Djiboutian prisoners of war and the implementation of resolution 1862 (2009). The mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group was expanded to include monitoring and reporting on the implementation of these new measures. Furthermore, Member States were required to report to the Security Council within 120 days on steps taken to implement the provisions of resolution 2023 (2011).

7. Prior to the adoption of the resolution, in a letter dated 25 October 2011 to the President of the Security Council (see S/2011/663), the Government of Eritrea had informed Member States of the request of the President of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki, to address the Council on "issues related to Ethiopia's occupation of sovereign Eritrean territory and Eritrea's constructive regional policies and its broad and positive engagements". On 30 November 2011, the President of the Council extended an invitation to Eritrea and its neighbouring countries to brief the Council. In a subsequent letter to the President of the Council, dated 3 December 2011 (see S/2011/753), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Eritrea expressed his Government's strong objections to the efforts of the United States of America to "prevent the intervention of President Isaias Afwerki from having any influence on the Council's deliberations ... [by making] it logistically impossible and rendering it a mere formality and utterly meaningless". On 5 December 2011, the Council heard interventions by the President of Djibouti, Ismaël Omar Guelleh; the President of Somalia, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed; the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi; the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya, Moses Wetangula; and the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the African Union, Mull Katende, speaking by means of videoconference from Addis Ababa. All of them urged the Council to adopt the draft resolution on Eritrea.

8. In January 2012, the African Union Peace and Security Council called for the full implementation of Security Council resolutions 2023 (2011) and 1907 (2009). This was reiterated in the decision of the eighteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union. In the lead-up to these events, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) issued two communiqués, on 28 June and 4 July 2011, calling on the African Union and the United Nations Security Council to fully implement existing sanctions on Eritrea and impose additional measures targeting the "diaspora tax" and the mining sector.

9. Tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia had perceptibly escalated in March 2011 when the Ethiopian Government issued a series of public statements announcing a tougher policy on Eritrea that entailed the use of both its diplomatic and its military capacity to bring about regime change in that country. These statements followed the arrest of "terrorists" who were allegedly under orders from the Eritrean Government to attack Ethiopian targets. Ethiopia proclaimed that it had also uncovered evidence of Eritrea's complicity in fomenting a North Africa-type revolution in Ethiopia. It also explained that its new stance was due to its frustration at the lack of enforcement of the sanctions regime on Eritrea under resolution 1907

(2009) and the latter's limitless capacity to incite instability. Ethiopia clarified that its initial response would be focused on mobilizing the international community to apply increased pressure on Eritrea.

10. In a letter dated 25 March 2011 to the President of the Security Council (S/2011/181), Eritrea expressed concern about Ethiopia's belligerent statements and threats of the use of force, stating that during the past 10 years, Ethiopia had been actively pursuing a hostile policy against it, including support for Eritrean armed groups, leading to regional instability. Eritrea referred to the "unbalanced" sanctions imposed under resolution 1907 (2009), particularly the arms embargo, stating that those measures "could potentially encourage Ethiopia to contemplate reckless acts of further aggression and subversion against Eritrea". It accused Ethiopia of violating the Charter of the United Nations and international law by threatening military action and by continuing to occupy land awarded to it by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission.

11. Eritrea restated its long-held position that it was "prepared for full normalization as soon as Ethiopia accepts its international treaty obligations and withdraws from sovereign Eritrean territory". Eritrea called on the Security Council to uphold the demarcation decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, as it was obligated to do under the Algiers Agreement and the United Nations Charter, and to ensure the withdrawal of Ethiopia from the occupied Eritrean territories. Referring to the same issue, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said in his statement to the Security Council on 5 December 2011 that while Ethiopia "may or may not like the delimitation decision ... we have made it officially and abundantly clear that we accept it unconditionally. ... What we have therefore asked the Eritreans to do is to engage us in dialogue so that we can move towards demarcation. That is what Nigeria and Cameroon did; they engaged in dialogue to implement a delimitation decision".

12. On 18 July 2011, the final report of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, containing its findings and recommendations, was issued as a document of the Security Council (see S/2011/433). The report provided a detailed account, with supporting evidence, of Eritrea's violations of resolutions 1844 (2008) and 1907 (2009), including allegations of its continuing support for Al-Shabaab in Somalia and other armed groups in the region, as well as its involvement in a plot to disrupt the African Union summit held in Addis Ababa in January 2011. On 19 July 2011, the Council held an informal interactive dialogue with Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda and the IGAD facilitator for Somalia.

13. Prior to adopting the recommendations contained in the report of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, the Committee on Somalia and Eritrea provided both the Governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia with the opportunity to present their respective views on the report. On 22 July 2011, the Political Adviser to the President of Eritrea denied the allegations contained in the report and informed the Committee of his Government's intention to submit a comprehensive response to it. On 27 July 2011, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia briefed the Committee and presented evidence of Eritrea's alleged complicity in the plan to disrupt the African Union summit in January 2011.

14. On 24 July 2011, I met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Eritrea and the Political Adviser to the President of Eritrea, who assured me that Eritrea had a contribution to make towards regional peace and security, particularly with respect

to Somalia, the outstanding issues between the Sudan and South Sudan regarding the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and Darfur. The Minister underlined the Government's intention to strengthen its relationship with the United Nations family. On 31 July 2011, I received a letter from President Afwerki in which he expressed concern about Ethiopia's efforts to mobilize the Security Council to impose additional sanctions on Eritrea and urged me to play a role in preventing this from materializing. In my response, I emphasized that the application of sanctions was under the remit of the Security Council and encouraged his Government to continue its dialogue with the Council. This was followed by a series of letters from the Eritrean Government to the Security Council and to me in which it protested the draft resolution on Eritrea and asked Council members to reject it.

15. On 20 October 2011, the Eritrean Government submitted its comprehensive response to the report of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group to the Committee and the Security Council (see S/2011/652). It stated that the report lacked credible and conclusive evidence to support the allegations that Eritrea had violated resolution 1907 (2009). On Eritrea's involvement in a plan to disrupt the African Union summit, which in its view underpinned the drive to impose additional sanctions, Eritrea explained that it would have been counterproductive to carry out such an attack, particularly following its recent re-engagement with the African Union after a long absence and its participation in the summit. Eritrea accused Ethiopia of fabricating this plot to justify its push for the expansion of the sanctions regime.

16. In a letter dated 18 October 2011 addressed to me, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Eritrea stated that Ethiopia had "illegally obstructed" Eritrea from attending the fortieth extraordinary session of IGAD, convened in Addis Ababa on 24 August 2011. He stressed that Ethiopia needed to be urged to respect Eritrea's right to participate in any IGAD-sponsored meetings effective 25 July 2011, when Eritrea requested to be readmitted to IGAD.

17. In September 2011, I met with President Afwerki in New York during the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly. The President stated that the border issue with Ethiopia was a "closed chapter" and that there was "nothing to negotiate". He added, however, that the credibility of the Security Council was on the line and that it needed to make a decision. He also stated that Eritrea aspired to work with all the parties to promote peace and stability in Somalia, the Sudan and South Sudan.

18. In a letter dated 8 November 2011, the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations informed the Committee on Somalia and Eritrea of credible intelligence reports indicating that "Eritrea continues to carry out actions that aim to destabilize the already fragile situation in Somalia and the Horn of Africa in general". The letter stated that in early November 2011, three planes carrying weapons and other supplies to Al-Shabaab had landed in the Somali town of Baidoa, which was under the extremist group's control at the time. The letter alleged that "available information indicates that the arms emanated from Eritrea". Stressing that Eritrea's actions were consistent with the findings of the report of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, the letter called on the Committee and the Council to take appropriate action.

19. On 18 January, the Government of Ethiopia informed the Security Council of an attack that had been carried out two days earlier by gunmen, targeting a group of 22 tourists travelling in Afar Regional State in the north-eastern part of the country. Five people had been killed (two Germans, two Hungarians and an Austrian), four

had been injured (an Italian, a Hungarian and two Germans) and three Ethiopians had been kidnapped. The Ethiopian Government accused Eritrea of direct involvement in the incident, declaring that it would take any action necessary to stop Eritrea's overt support for terrorist activity.

20. In a subsequent letter to the President of the Security Council, dated 14 March 2012 (see S/2012/158), the Ethiopian Government expressed frustration about the international community's unsuccessful efforts to coerce Eritrea to comply with relevant Council resolutions, stating that the recent terrorist act against the tourists had been a clear indication of the determination of the Eritrean regime to pursue its destructive role in disregard of international law and norms. Ethiopia called on the Security Council to ensure the implementation of the resolutions and stated that it reserved its right of self-defence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

21. On 15 March 2012, the Ethiopian army attacked three alleged rebel bases inside Eritrea in retaliation for the killing and kidnapping of tourists. Eritrea initially dismissed the attack as an attempt by Ethiopia to divert attention from the tenth anniversary of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission ruling. Subsequently, the Eritrean Government requested the Security Council to conduct an investigation into the incident (see S/2012/181).

22. In its midterm briefing to the Committee on Somalia and Eritrea in February 2012, the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group reported that it had obtained sufficient information about and evidence of Eritrea's recent violations of resolutions 1844 (2008) and 1907 (2009), including support for the Ogaden National Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Front. With respect to resolution 1862 (2009), on the Djibouti-Eritrea border conflict, the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group referred to the letter that I had received from the Government of Djibouti on 4 October 2011 concerning the escape of two Djiboutian military personnel (captured at Ras Doumeira in June 2008) from Eritrean custody on 5 September 2011. Although Eritrea has consistently denied the existence of Djiboutian prisoners of war, the Group had the opportunity to interview the former detainees and establish the credibility of their accounts.

23. The Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group also stated that, upon investigation of the statement by the Government of Kenya, its preliminary findings indicated that the alleged flights to Baidoa had not in fact taken place. On 24 April 2012, the Group requested the Government of Kenya to share any evidence that would support the allegations that it had made against Eritrea. To date, no reply has been received from the Government of Kenya.

24. The Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group informed the Committee on Somalia and Eritrea that it had begun to investigate, as mandated by the Security Council in resolution 2023 (2011), the extent of Eritrea's use of extortion, threats of violence and other means to collect taxes outside Eritrea from its nationals or other individuals of Eritrean descent. The Group also reported on its continuing efforts to revise and update the information that it had already gathered on those individuals and entities that met the criteria for listing as stipulated in resolutions 1844 (2008) and 1907 (2009). The Group also pointed out that it continued to monitor the implementation of the sanctions against the 10 individuals and one entity on the Committee's list. The Group expressed the view that additional designations were required if the targeted measures were to remain credible and have a positive, deterrent effect on potential violators of the sanctions regime on Somalia and Eritrea.

25. In a letter dated 3 May 2012 addressed to me, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Eritrea highlighted the fact that 13 April 2012 marked the tenth anniversary of the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission. As Ethiopia continued to illegally occupy sovereign Eritrean territory, "silence and inaction by the United Nations remains an abdication of responsibility". He emphasized that Ethiopia's demand for dialogue had always been aimed at revising the Commission's decision and requested that I exercise my moral authority to end Ethiopia's occupation.

III. Compliance by Eritrea with resolution 2023 (2011)

26. On 2 May 2012, the Government of Eritrea submitted a letter in response to the note verbale on resolution 2023 (2011). Eritrea registered its serious concern about the sanctions regime, which, it believed, had "targeted the State of Eritrea unfairly on the basis of politically motivated, unfounded and unsubstantiated allegations". The letter appealed for the lifting of sanctions.

27. Furthermore, the letter noted that the measures imposed on Eritrea had emboldened Ethiopia to publicly express its intentions to support regime change in Eritrea through military means and to purchase arms with the aim of using them against Eritrea. The letter emphasized that Eritrea's sovereignty and territorial integrity continued to be violated by Ethiopia's continuing occupation of the Eritrean town of Badme and other areas in breach of the Algiers Peace Agreement and the United Nations Charter.

28. The letter then proceeded to outline Eritrea's regional policy and actions in support of that policy in the Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti along the same lines as in its comprehensive response to the report of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group. Eritrea claimed that its portrayal as a destabilizing force in the region did not reflect the reality on the ground, stating that it had diplomatic relations with all the countries in the region with the exception of Ethiopia. It had recently appointed a new resident Ambassador in Uganda and had maintained its representation to the African Union since late 2010. Eritrea referred to its efforts to reactivate its membership in IGAD, which, it said, had been initially welcomed by the IGAD secretariat and subsequently blocked by Ethiopia.

29. Eritrea referred to its constructive engagement on the Sudan starting with its contribution to the Declaration of Principles adopted by IGAD in 1994 and its role in facilitating negotiations on the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Eritrea said it had welcomed the referendum in South Sudan and had demonstrated its solidarity with and support for the new State. Eritrea also mentioned its catalytic role in the Asmara peace accord between the Government of the Sudan and the eastern opposition movements in 2006, as well as its joint efforts with Chad, Libya and Qatar in finding a lasting solution to the Darfur conflict.

30. With respect to Somalia, the letter referred to Eritrea's support for the efforts of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia to convene a conference in Asmara in 2007 to help stabilize the country, noting that Al-Shabaab had, at the time, denounced it as a "conference with a secular agenda". Eritrea reiterated that as a matter of principle, it did not support Al-Shabaab or any form of extremism, referring to its past endeavours to combat the spread of terrorism in the region in the early 1990s. Eritrea stated that its attempts to engage the Transitional Federal Government following the Istanbul Conference of May 2010 had not been successful.

31. Eritrea also lamented Ethiopia's efforts to demonize it as the main culprit in Somalia's crisis, thus mobilizing other IGAD countries to oppose its participation in the United Nations high-level meeting of 23 September 2010 and the London Conference on Somalia, held in March 2012.

32. In his briefing to the Council on 5 December 2011, President Sharif of Somalia said that he had sought the support of Libya's former President Qadhafi in 2009 in persuading Eritrea not to intervene in his country. President Sharif indicated that his effort had been rebuffed by President Afwerki, who had informed Qadhafi that reconciliation with Somalia was impossible.

33. Eritrea stated that it remained committed to the mediation process initiated by the Emir of Qatar to resolve its border dispute with Djibouti, including the question of missing persons and prisoners of war as governed by the peace agreement of 6 June 2010. Eritrea referred to its withdrawal from the border area and the deployment of Qatari troops to monitor the border between the two countries, claiming that it had restrained itself on that subject in an effort to avoid compromising the Qatari mediation process.

34. The letter stressed that the sanctions regime had created an imbalance in the region "allowing Ethiopia and the armed groups it supports to openly engage in naked aggression against the territorial integrity of Eritrea". In this connection, Eritrea awaited the response of the Security Council to its request for a full investigation into the armed incursion into Eritrean territory by Ethiopia on 15 March 2012. Eritrea viewed Ethiopia's claim that it was pursuing Afari terrorist elements as not credible. Eritrea stressed that ending Ethiopia's occupation of its territory would lead to the normalization of bilateral ties and pave the way for lasting peace. The lack of serious and credible action against Ethiopia would continue to impede regional peace and security.

35. On the question of the "diaspora tax", Eritrea drew attention to its sovereign right to levy taxes on its citizens, emphasizing that the revenue collected from the tax was aimed at providing a "social cushion for the dependants of martyrs of war, disabled war veterans and national reconstruction and development" projects. Eritrea insisted that the domestic law under which the tax had been created was not extrajudicial and that the tax was levied on Eritrean citizens living abroad, not on individuals of Eritrean descent. As all Governments pursued "legally specified enforcement measures to regulate tax evasion", in the case of Eritrea, services related to the acquisition of property or land and to obtaining business licenses were withheld from members of the Eritrean diaspora who failed to meet their fiscal obligations. In Eritrea's view, this could not be characterized as using extortion or threats of violence, as indicated in resolution 2023 (2011). Eritrea reported that nationals residing abroad had now started to send their payments directly to Asmara while the Government finalized a new administrative procedure for the collection of taxes.

36. With respect to the mining sector, Eritrea reported that foreign and local investments followed established standards of transparency and accountability, highlighting that this sector had begun production only last year.

37. Finally, Eritrea drew attention to the numerous appeals that it had made to the Security Council to replace the current Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group with one that was "independent, impartial and credible".

IV. Observations

38. The present report outlines key events leading to the adoption of resolution 2023 (2011), on Eritrea, and major developments since then. Although the Council requested me to report on Eritrea's compliance with the resolution, the Secretariat has no independent means of verifying such compliance and has therefore relied on information provided by the Government of Eritrea, official United Nations documents, reports of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group and formal and informal exchanges with Member States.

39. Since my previous report on Eritrea to the Security Council (S/2010/327), of 22 June 2010, tensions in the Horn of Africa have steadily increased. The period in question was marked by Ethiopia's allegations of Eritrean involvement in a plot to disrupt the African Union summit held in Addis Ababa in early 2011. This was subsequently corroborated in the report of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group of 18 July 2011 (see S/2011/433), which also provided evidence of Eritrea's continuing support for various armed groups in the region.

40. The situation deteriorated further in March 2012 when Ethiopia carried out a military attack on alleged Afar training bases inside Eritrea in response to the killing and kidnapping of Western tourists in Ethiopia. These developments, combined with the lack of progress in the implementation of the Qatar-mediated peace agreement of June 2010 between Djibouti and Eritrea, have increased the already fragile regional dynamics in the Horn of Africa.

41. In respect of the latter, it should be recalled that in a letter dated 23 December 2010, to the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs outlined the range of services that the United Nations could provide with regard to the demarcation of the boundary between Djibouti and Eritrea. I wish to underline that the United Nations stands ready to assist the parties and Qatar in this regard.

42. Eritrea has consistently denied all allegations that it has violated Security Council resolutions, and has called on the Council to lift the targeted sanctions imposed on it. In this regard, I welcome Eritrea's stated efforts to re-engage with the region and the international community, including through interactions with the Council and its Committee on Somalia and Eritrea, and by taking steps to restore its membership in IGAD. The application of sanctions is not an end in itself, but a means to an end.

43. I strongly urge the Eritrean Government to engage in and maintain an open dialogue not only with the Committee, but also with the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, as a way to address its grievances and present its views. I also urge Eritrea to do more to establish evidence of its compliance with resolutions 1907 (2009) and 2023 (2011).

44. The lack of progress in the implementation of the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission continues to negatively affect the multifaceted and complex regional dynamics in the Horn of Africa and the normalization of relations between the two countries. A comprehensive approach should be adopted by States in the region, IGAD, the African Union and the United Nations to address the broader aspects of the conflict in the region, including this long-standing border stalemate.